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Abstract 
The literature on the Danish and Norwegian labor market systems emphasizes 
the commonalities of the two systems. We challenge this perception by investi-
gating how employers in multinational companies in Denmark and Norway 
communicate with employees on staffing changes. We argue that the develop-
ment of ‘flexicurity’ in Denmark grants Danish employers considerably greater 
latitude in engaging in staffing changes than its Nordic counterpart, Norway. 
Institutional theory leads us to suppose that large firms located in the Danish 
setting will be less likely to engage in employer–employee communication on 
staffing plans than their Norwegian counterparts. In addition, we argue that in 
the Danish context indigenous firms will have a better insight into the norma-
tive and cognitive aspects to flexicurity than foreign-owned firms, meaning that 
they are more likely to engage in institutional entrepreneurialism than their for-
eign-owned counterparts. We supplement institutional theory with an actor per-
spective in order to take into account the role of labor unions. Our analysis is 
based on a survey of 203 firms in Norway and Denmark which are either indig-
enous multinational companies or the subsidiaries of foreign multinational 
companies. The differences we observe cause us to conclude that the notion of a 
common Nordic model is problematic. 
Introduction 
In regulatory terms, certain countries are regarded as institutionally so similar 
that they are grouped together. In the case of Denmark and Norway, it has been 
common to refer to them as fitting a Nordic model characterized by a particular-
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ly consultative employer–employee relationship. This grouping together of 
Nordic countries has been underpinned by substantial empirical support. For 
example, in their operationalization of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ thesis (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001), Hall and Gingerich (2004), employing data from the ear-
ly1990 s, found that Denmark and Norway had virtually identical levels of insti-
tutional coordination. Likewise, using comparative data collected in 
1995, Gooderham et al. (1999) observed that firms in Denmark and Norway 
were similar in terms of having a distinctively ‘collaborative mode’ of employ-
er–employee communication. In this article, we address this perception of simi-
larity between Denmark and Norway arguing that the Industrial Relations sys-
tems of the two countries have developed in significantly different directions. 
Thus, we question the notion of there being a definitive Nordic model. 
In Denmark, labor market issues are to a considerable degree regulated 
through collective agreements that are based on the continuous fine-tuning of 
the interests of labor and employers. In simple terms, each time employers have 
been awarded flexibility in the course of collective bargaining, labor has typi-
cally obtained enhanced security. The system has come to be labeled ‘flexicuri-
ty’ and has two main components (Madsen, 2003). The flexibility component of 
the model is characterized by relatively liberal redundancy rules that give em-
ployers the right to hire and dismiss employees at short notice – this is the flexi-
bility that employers call for. As a result, Denmark has not only higher job mo-
bility than in any other Nordic country (TemaNord, 2010), but also job tenure at 
the same level as in liberal market regimes such as the UK (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2004). The security com-
ponent refers to the provision of comparatively generous unemployment bene-
fits and training provision. 
The concept of flexicurity was introduced in the 1990s in order to communi-
cate an empirical reality that had evolved over several decades (Van den Berg, 
2008). Madsen et al. (2011) argue that this model constitutes a source of diver-
gence between Denmark and the other Nordic countries. Similarly, a large-scale 
Nordic study states that its ‘main conclusion … is that Denmark has a special 
combination of institutions related to its labor market’ (TemaNord, 2010: 13). 
The same study further argues that ‘this flexicurity nexus’ is a main factor driv-
ing Denmark’s high labor mobility rates. By contrast in Norway, flexicurity, in 
the sense of deregulation of employment protection combined with increased 
social protection, has at no stage been on the political agenda (Eironline, 2009). 
Indeed, unlike in Denmark where the system of industrial relations evolves 
through on-going negotiations, in Norway it remains regulated through a com-
bination of legislation and cooperative agreements. 
Employing institutional theory we address the impact of this regulatory dif-
ference between Denmark and Norway on direct and indirect employer–
employee communication in regard to impending staffing plans. We distinguish 
direct and indirect communication because the Nordic model is not only charac-
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terized by powerful labor unions that ultimately are legally entitled to be con-
sulted on changes that affect their members, but also by relatively informal em-
ployer–employee relations at the firm level characterized by regular, direct 
briefings on company strategy. In line with institutional theory we assume that 
informal relations are governed by normative and cognitive aspects of the insti-
tutional environment and that deviating from these can undermine perceived 
legitimacy (Scott, 2001). Unlike regulations, normative and cognitive aspects 
are more diffuse and therefore more tacit. As outsiders, foreign multinational 
companies (MNCs) may have greater difficulty in interpreting these correctly 
and may be less creative/strategic in their dealings with employees. In other 
words, in trying to imitate they are more passive and tend more towards acqui-
escence than indigenous firms. 
Our analysis draws on a sample comprising large indigenous firms, all of 
which are MNCs, and subsidiaries of foreign-owned MNCs in both Norway and 
Denmark. Thus, within each of the two national settings we distinguish indige-
nous firms from the subsidiaries of multinational MNCs. We do this in order to 
investigate which of these actors are the more proactive in challenging the nor-
mative and cognitive aspects to the ‘rules of the (Danish) game’ (North, 1990). 
Thus, our overarching hypothesis is twofold. We expect that flexicurity, charac-
terized by high job mobility and greater latitude for Danish employers, has re-
sulted in firms located in Denmark diverging in their employee communication 
practices from their Norwegian counterparts. However, within Denmark we will 
argue that indigenous firms have a more developed ‘feel’ for the legitimate pos-
sibilities that flexicurity has introduced in regard to direct employer–employee 
communication. 
In the next sections, we introduce the context of our study. We start with a 
broad presentation of the institutional regimes of Denmark and Norway, arguing 
that the two national systems of labor market regulations differ more than meets 
the eye. This is followed by a discussion of institutional theory which enables 
us to develop more specific hypotheses regarding direct and indirect employer–
employee communication in Denmark and Norway. After delineating our data 
set we test these and in the final section we discuss the implications of our find-
ings. 
 
The institutional regimes of Denmark and Norway 
In an analysis of advanced economies Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish be-
tween two generic institutional contexts, liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs). Typical LME regimes are the Anglo-
Saxon countries such as the USA and the UK, while the typical CME regimes 
are the northern European countries such as Germany, Norway and Denmark. In 
LMEs, the interactions among firms and other actors such as labor unions and 
banks are organized on the basis of free markets. In contrast, in CMEs these 
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interactions are to a significant extent detached from the market so that they 
take place between ‘stakeholders’ and on a more strategic and long-term basis. 
In CMEs, there is a collaborative interaction among the political system, em-
ployers and labor unions in regard to the regulation of the labor market. Thus a 
substantial part of the labor market in CMEs is regulated on the basis of collec-
tive agreements underpinned by employment law, or by employment law with 
the social partners as important and respected stakeholders. 
On the workplace level CME regimes are characterized by a significantly 
greater degree of consultation of labor unions or employee representatives on 
strategic decision making – for example, in regard to outsourcing and redun-
dancies – than is the case in LME regimes. In regard to human resource man-
agement (HRM) practices, the LME–CME divide is associated with a number 
of differences. Characteristically, LME firms are associated with significantly 
greater salary differential and a greater use of individualized salary negotiations. 
They also typically have greater latitude in regard to terminating employment 
contracts than CME firms. 
Using extant data sets originating from the early part of the 1990s, Hall and 
Gingerich (2004) developed an empirical measure of the LME–CME divide. 
Their index indicates that the USA is the ‘purest’ LME regime and Germany its 
diametrical opposite. While the measures for both Norway and Denmark indi-
cate that both countries clearly are CMEs, the index also suggests that they are 
somewhat different from Germany; in other words, Norway and Denmark have 
a somewhat ambiguous status as CME countries (Campbell et al., 2006). One 
particular difference is that the legislation governing the employer–labor union 
relationship of Norway and Denmark (and the other Nordic countries) is less 
formalized and less detailed than is the case for Germany. Thus, Madsen 
et al. observe that for Denmark although it is: 
a typical coordinated market economy…Danish labour market regulation al-
so encompasses clear liberal elements…with the greater part of its regulation 
taking place within the framework of collective bargaining and not via legisla-
tion (2011: 225). 
This distinguishes Denmark from Germany where ‘(the) extensive social 
regulation…has always been regulated by law and not by collective bargaining’ 
(Keller and Kirsch, 2011: 197). In Denmark, rather than legally determined 
accords, agreements between employers and labor unions are reached through 
ongoing discussion and consultation. Thus, the labor market reforms of 1994 
(including the obligation to participate in activation programs) and 1996 were a 
product of tripartite agreements among employer federations, labor unions and 
the state. Hence, the relationship is more flexible than is the case for Germany. 
Although Norway is more regulated in relation to staffing issues than Denmark, 
in relation to Germany, extensive cooperation between employers and labor 
unions is one of the characteristics of the ‘Nordic model’ (Løken and Stokke, 
2009). Additionally, working life in both Denmark and Norway is characterized 
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by direct communication between employers and employees, compared to other 
European countries (Esser and Olsen, 2012; Gill and Krieger, 2000). 
This distinction between the legalistic context of Germany and the more 
flexible Nordic context is reflected in Gooderham et al.'s (1999) analysis of 
differences in the deployment of HRM practices. On the one hand their study 
confirms the distinction between Germany and the Nordic countries and LME 
countries in regard to the use of ‘calculative’ HRM practices: thus the former 
make far less use of individual performance-related rewards than the latter. 
However, they also observed that as opposed to Germany, firms in the Nordic 
context made a marked use of local, firm-level consultative HRM practices 
characterized by considerable employer–employee communication. Thus, they 
concluded that Germany and the Nordic countries constitute two distinct HRM 
regimes. 
The notion is that Nordic countries are characterized by commonalities that 
together constitute a distinct Nordic model. However, more fine-grained anal-
yses of Denmark and Norway have suggested that they have become somewhat 
dissimilar. For example, there are indications that HRM in Denmark is less 
formalized, structured and top–down than in Norway (Rogaczewska et al., 
2004). Likewise, it is suggested that the relationship between employers and 
labor unions in Denmark is becoming more fractious than in Norway (Amable, 
2003), and that the fall in union density has been stronger in Denmark than in 
Norway since the mid-1990s (Nergaard, 2010). In the next section we examine 
these differences in more detail. 
 
Flexicurity and differences between Norway and Denmark 
A core feature of the Danish flexicurity model is that it combines elements from 
welfare systems and labor market regulation (Anderson and Pontusson, 
2007; Madsen, 2003). The aim of flexicurity is that it increases both labor mar-
ket flexibility and the security of individual employees. The main elements of 
the model comprise a relatively weak protection against redundancy, generous 
unemployment benefits, and an active labor market policy that provides training 
if necessary (Madsen, 2003; TemaNord, 2010). Weak employment protection 
provides employers with flexibility to adjust their workforces in relation to 
changes in demand. This form of flexibility is generally regarded as a source of 
numerical or external flexibility (e.g. Pfeffer and Baron, 1988), and employers’ 
use of work arrangements enhancing such flexibility differs between employ-
ment regimes (Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004). Greve (2012) argues that the em-
ployment relationship in Denmark has been subject to profound changes over 
the last 10–15 years. In particular, he points to active labor market policies that 
emphasize ‘work first’ rather than training, the erosion of out-of-work benefits 
and the reduction of the influence of the unions. It has been argued that these 
trends have become even more apparent during the recent economic down-turn 
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(Ibsen, 2011; Madsen, 2011).Madsen et al. (2011) acknowledge that the devel-
opment in Denmark has provided employers with a degree of staffing flexibility 
‘on par with that of the United Kingdom’, so in this regard Denmark is ‘differ-
ent from that of the other Nordic countries’: that is, in regard to this particular 
issue Denmark has LME traits. 
It is important, however, to bear in mind that the flexicurity model has its or-
igins in tripartite negotiations and a series of tripartite agreements that accom-
modated both employer organizations’ call for decentralized negotiations and 
labor unions’ demands for the maintenance of robust collective agreements as a 
backup if local consultations should fail. This is fundamentally dissimilar to the 
decentralization that emerged in the United Kingdom, where employment flexi-
bility was precipitated by the weakening of the bargaining power of labor un-
ions and the collective bargaining system. 
In Denmark, the contractual arrangements for individual and collective dis-
missal are predominantly regulated by the social partners through sectoral col-
lective agreements. By contrast, employment relations and dismissal in Norway 
are generally regulated through legislation (Eironline, 2009). As stated in 
the Working Environment Act (2005), in Norway, the main principle concern-
ing employment relations is that employees should have an open-ended contract 
(‘fast ansettelse’). The consequences of these two approaches are indicated in a 
comparison of 40 OECD countries in which Denmark was ranked as one of 12 
countries with the weakest employment protection legislation (EPL), while 
Norway was ranked as having the ninth strictest EPL (OECD, 2008; see al-
so TemaNord, 2010). As such, the flexicurity system in Denmark means that the 
two countries, while retaining many of the common features of CMEs, diverge 
in terms of how staffing is regulated. Employers in Norway face both stricter 
and more extensive legislation on staffing than employers in Denmark. 
 
Employer–employee communication 
In principle, employer–employee consultation or communication can take place 
through either indirect or direct voice mechanisms. ‘Employee voice is any type 
of mechanism, structure or practice, which provides an employee with an op-
portunity to express an opinion or participate in decision-making within their 
organization’ (Lavelle et al., 2010: 396). Whereas indirect communication takes 
place through unions, collective bargaining or, for example, via employee rep-
resentatives in Cooperation Committees, direct communication involves no 
intermediary. 
In both Denmark and Norway, larger MNCs are subject to the European 
Works Councils Directive. In principle, this gives representatives of workers 
from all European countries a line of communication to top management and 
guarantees that employees in different countries are all told the same thing at 
the same time about company policies and plans. European Works Councils 
also provide workers’ representatives in national works councils the opportunity 
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to consult with each other and to develop a common European response to em-
ployers’ transnational plans, which management must then consider before 
those plans are implemented. In the sample, that is the empirical base for our 
study, we observe that 32% and 38% respectively of the Norwegian and the 
Danish firms have European Works Councils. 
Over and above this directive, traditionally a key component of the Nordic 
model, is extensive employer–employee communication (Knudsen, 
1995; Thorsrud and Emery, 1970). However, as we will now discuss, there are 
differences between Denmark and Norway with regard to when employers are 
required to consult employees on staffing changes. 
In Norway, indirect communication is regulated in labor law and collective 
agreements. If a firm plans to make changes in staffing, for instance a downsiz-
ing, it is legally obliged to inform and discuss this with union representatives at 
an early stage (Working Environment Act (§15-2)). Employers are also subject 
to regulations that specify the provision of information and consultation in 
changing staffing levels and in changes to the organization of work. These regu-
lations are entrenched in the Working Environment Act and collective pay 
agreements which specify not only that local labor union representatives must 
be consulted, but also that this consultation must take place at the earliest possi-
ble point in time. Although in the final instance it is employers who make the 
decision and who have the responsibility for any redundancies, local labor un-
ion representatives must be given the opportunity to express their opinion in 
regard to the basis for redundancies and, if they consider it acceptable, to then 
determine the criteria that will govern it. Since 2010, the Working Environment 
Act has ruled that employers must discuss their use of temporary employees 
with local labor union representatives at least annually. This change is an exam-
ple of a strengthening of the legislation on indirect voice. 
In Denmark, rather than strictly legal obligations, regulatory obligations de-
rive from different types of cooperation agreement. The most typical of these 
are the Cooperation Agreements between the employers federation DA, and the 
labor unions federation LO. The employers’ right to introduce staffing changes 
at short notice is a central part of the flexicurity model, and this regulatory pres-
sure to engage with labor unions on staffing plans is arguably diluted. In Den-
mark, the most important stipulations on employer–labor union information and 
consultation are to be found in cooperation agreements like the Cooperation 
Agreement (2006) (the first such agreement was entered in 1947) between DA 
and LO. The agreement is broadly formulated and generally emphasizes the 
importance of engaging in a high degree of information provision and consulta-
tion. Employers are obliged by the agreement to update the local Cooperation 
Committees on the financial position and prospects of the company and the 
firm’s staffing plans. In firms where there are no works Cooperation Commit-
tees employees are to be informed individually and in groups. Employers also 
have to provide information on any ‘significant changes and developments with 
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regard to any introduction of new technology in production and administration’ 
as well on ‘the employment situation’ (Cooperation Agreement, 2006: 7–8). 
More specifically, the agreement stipulates what the firm ought to do in the case 
of having to engage in redundancies particularly, as a consequence of introduc-
ing new technology. In other words, while for Norway it is still the case that 
indirect communication is governed by well-defined regulations, in combination 
with collective agreements, in Denmark it is governed on the basis of broad 
agreements. 
Norway and Denmark are ostensibly similar in their modes of regulating 
employer–employee direct communication on staffing plans: that is, through 
accords that have been developed between the employers federation and the 
labor unions federation. In Norway1 this accord is referred to as ‘Hovedavtalen’ 
(Main agreement), while in Denmark the accord is part of the Cooperation 
Agreement. However, in the case of Denmark, these regulatory obligations are 
constantly challenged by the system of flexicurity and the latitude it grants em-
ployers to initiate prompt staffing changes. Flexicurity entails a recurrent ex-
change of flexibility and security in the context of collective bargaining. In this 
context employers’ organizations seek to maximize flexibility in regard to staff-
ing, including the level and timing of information on changes in staffing. What 
determines the extent of direct communication between employers and employ-
ees on staffing plans in the context of a single firm are obligations of a distinctly 
more normative or cognitive kind. The employer’s perception of what those 
obligations actually are may vary significantly. 
Thus, if we disregard the European Works Councils we may observe that 
while the regulatory frameworks governing the Danish and Norwegian labor 
markets are similar in their intentions, there are significant differences. In Nor-
way, employers have less latitude for hiring and firing than their counterparts in 
Denmark. Furthermore, the legislation regarding indirect communication is 
more extensive in Norway. Overall, in Norway hiring and firing and communi-
cation mechanisms for communicating changes in work organization (e.g. 
downsizing and the use of temporary labor) are all regulated in labor law (The 
Working Environment Act). In other words, the regulations governing employ-
ment issues in Norway are more stringent than in Denmark. As such, the institu-
tional setting of Denmark in regard to the employment contract is potentially 
more malleable than that of Norway. In the next section we apply institutional 
theory in order to derive hypotheses on the implications of the introduction of 
flexicurity in Denmark for employer–employee communication. 
 
Institutional theory 
Neo-institutional theory is established as a key approach in conducting cross-
national analyses of labor market regimes. In particular, in its emphasis on the 
significance of differences in formal regulatory arrangements for modes of 
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management of firms it has generated insights into cross-national dissimilarities 
in regard to the selection of HRM practices (Gooderham et al., 1999, 2006). 
Although there are differences in the way in which new institutional theory has 
been conceptualized (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991;Scott, 2001; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1996), one commonality is that organizations are viewed as experienc-
ing pressure to develop organizational forms and management practices that are 
considered legitimate by their external environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1983). 
If they fail to achieve legitimacy they expose themselves to the danger of being 
exposed to sanctions. Within specific organizational fields this pressure to 
achieve legitimacy leads to organizational isomorphism (Scott, 2001). Institu-
tional theory distinguishes three distinctive but overlapping dimensions of ex-
ternal pressure: the cognitive, the normative and the regulatory. 
Institutional theory suggests that, in order to survive, organizations need to 
gain legitimacy in regard to all three dimensions and that as a result they will 
tend to conform to both the rules and the belief systems prevailing in their envi-
ronments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, institutional theory argues that 
firms are not only responding to legislation, but also operating within an institu-
tional framework of norms, values and taken-for-granted assumptions about 
what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behavior (Fenton-
O’Creevy and Wood, 2007; Oliver, 1997). Given the tacit nature of these ‘rule 
of the game’ (North, 1990), it is reasonable to suppose that indigenous firms 
will have a more fine-tuned understanding of them than incoming, foreign-
owned firms. In seeking legitimacy in highly regulated institutional environ-
ments, foreign entrants will not only seek to conform, but also their lack of un-
derstanding of the tacit aspects of these environments may cause them to over-
conform. Thus, foreign entrants in seeking legitimacy may be more conserva-
tive in regard to introducing novel management practices. As such they are less 
inclined to engage in ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (Battilana et al., 2009) 
which will more likely be a feature of indigenous firms. 
This distinction between indigenous and foreign-owned firms is a reminder 
that theories, such as institutional theory, that emphasize structure need to be 
supplemented with an agency perspective. Agency theorists view structuralist 
accounts of organizational behavior as overly deterministic. Oliver 
(1991) argues that organizations may have significant latitude to deviate from 
exogenous pressures, and Battilana et al. (2009) argue that actors may have 
varying degrees of agency. It seems reasonable to suppose that degrees of avail-
able agency will not only be limited to actor understandings of the tacit implica-
tions of regulatory change, but will also reflect the degree to which other signif-
icant agents, such as labor unions, are proximate. In the case of employer–
employee communication we should distinguish indirect communication – 
where labor unions exert a nationally distinctive common influence, from direct 
communication – from which they are absent and where employers are there-
fore less constrained. It is in the latter context that we expect indigenous Danish 
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firms to engage in institutional entrepreneurialism to a greater degree than their 
foreign-owned equivalents. 
On the basis of the above discussion we can identify the following hypothe-
ses. 
 
Indirect communication 
The employment regime in Norway is characterized by stricter regulations on 
hiring and firing, and the mechanisms for indirect communication of changes in 
work organization are regulated in labor law to a greater extent than in Den-
mark. Given these differences we expect firms in Norway to engage in a greater 
degree of indirect communication than firms in Denmark. Thus we hypothesize: 
H1: Firms based in Norway engage in a greater degree of employer–
employee indirect communication than firms based in Denmark. 
In the context of Norway, due to the law-based regulations on employment 
relations and requirements on indirect communication we expect no significant 
differences between indigenous and foreign-owned firms in regard to indirect 
communication information on staffing issues. Within Denmark, we also expect 
no such differences because the cooperation agreements are specific in commit-
ting employers to engage in information provision on staffing. Furthermore, in 
both contexts labor unions are uniformly present and therefore exert a common 
influence across indigenous and foreign-owned firms. Thus we hypothesize: 
H2: Within Norway and Denmark respectively there is no difference in the 
degree to which indigenous and foreign-owned firms engage in employer–
employee indirect communication. 
 
Direct communication 
Whereas requirements on indirect communication are mainly based on legisla-
tion in combination with collective agreements in Norway, and in collective 
sector-specific agreements in Denmark, direct communication is more likely to 
be subject to normative and cognitive pressures. Direct communication will 
often take place in an informal way in the workplace. Given the Danish context, 
with its flexibility and associated high job mobility, employers may feel it less 
imperative and less obviously in their interests to inform on changes in work 
organization and staffing than their Norwegian counterparts, who have signifi-
cantly more durable workforces. Thus, based on the relative high job mobility 
deriving from flexicurity, we expect Danish firms to inform less on staffing 
plans compared to Norwegian firms. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Firms based in Norway engage in a greater degree of employer–
employee direct communication than firms based in Denmark 
.In Norway, the overall employment regime has been largely characterized 
by stability over an extended period of at least two decades. We may assume 
that this contributes to a widespread understanding of the normative and cogni-
tive aspects of the institutional regime among both indigenous and foreign-
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owned firms in regard to engaging in direct communication with employees on 
staffing. Thus: 
H4: Within Norway there is no difference in the degree to which indigenous 
and foreign-owned firms engage in employer–employee direct communication. 
In Denmark, the flexicurity model has been subject to a series of incremental 
changes and adaptations over the years. The evolving liberal market elements of 
the model in combination with high personnel turnover contributes to uncertain-
ty as to what constitutes normative and cognitive legitimacy. Institutional theory 
suggests that indigenous firms will be more likely to use this lack of clarity to 
challenge the established understandings of the ‘rules of the game’ compared to 
the foreign-based firms. In other words, the indigenous firms will more likely 
engage in institutional entrepreneurialism than foreign entrants to Denmark. 
Thus, we propose: 
H5: Within Denmark indigenous firms engage in less employer–employee 
direct communication than foreign-owned firms. 
Data and variables 
Data 
Our sample comprises firms located in either Denmark or Norway which are 
either the parents of MNCs or the subsidiaries of MNCs. In sampling, we chose 
to focus on the population of indigenous firms which have at least 500 employ-
ees worldwide, of whom at least 100 are based abroad, and the population of 
foreign-owned firms which have at least 100 employees and whose parent com-
panies employ at least 500 employees worldwide. The survey was conducted in 
2009–2010. Response rates for firms in Norway were 42% among indigenous 
firms (N = 36) and 21% among foreign-owned firms (N = 47). For Denmark, the 
corresponding percentages were 27 (N = 31) and 29 (N = 89). Analysis of miss-
ing firms indicated that the Norwegian sub-samples were representative in re-
gard to the overall industry distribution of the sub-populations (Steen, 2010). A 
similar analysis could not be conducted for the Danish sub-samples. Given that 
our total sample comprises only 203 firms – and that there were missing re-
sponses on each of the items in our analysis – this imposes a limit on the num-
ber of variables we can introduce in our analysis. Our analysis focuses on the 
largest occupational group (LOG) in each firm. 
 
Dependent variables 
We measure employer–employee indirect communication on staffing 
plans based on the question ‘Which of the following types of information is 
regularly provided to the LOG within the company in Denmark/Norway’. The 
two alternatives relating to staffing are (1) organization of work and (2) sub-
contractors and outsourcing. The answers range from 5 = management cooper-
ate with unions, 3 = management consult union representatives to 
1 = management decides solely. The two dimensions (1) and (2) are combined 
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into an index (1–5). Cronbach’s alpha is 0.675. The higher the values on this 
index, the more the cooperative strategies. 
We measure employer–employee direct communication on staffing plans us-
ing a single item: whether information on staffing plans is provided regularly to 
the LOG within the company in Denmark/Norway (yes = 1, no = 0). 
Arguably, the two measures of indirect and direct communications are rela-
tively simple. However, they do cover forms of staffing, such as sub-contracting 
and outsourcing, which are persistent and crucial features of how firms organize 
work (Davis-Blake and Broschak, 2009). These measures are also closely 
linked to flexicurity. The essence of the flexicurity model is to ensure flexibility 
for firms and security for workers. How firms make decisions regarding staff-
ing, and whether they include employees in these decisions, constitute im-
portant aspects of how flexicurity plays out at the firm level 
 
Independent variables 
Our main explanatory variables are country and ownership (see Table A-1). We 
distinguish between four groups of companies: 
 Indigenous companies in Denmark (reference) 
 Indigenous companies in Norway 
 Foreign-owned companies in Denmark 
 Foreign-owned companies in Norway 
 
In addition, we include the following control variables:
2
 
 Size: 100–500 employees (reference), 500–999 employees, and more 
than 1000 employees 
 Industry: manufacturing and service (reference) 
 HR body/committee: Is there a body within the worldwide company, 
such as a committee of senior managers, that develops HR policies that 
apply across countries = 1, else = 0? 
 Union recognition: Thinking of the LOG in the company in Den-
mark/Norway, are trade unions recognized for the purposes of collec-
tive employee representation at: all/most sites = 1, or no/some sites = 0 
(reference)? Based on this measure, union recognition on all/most sites 
is 71.6%. 
 
Findings 
Based on the institutional differences between Denmark and Norway we have 
hypothesized that while we expect to observe a between-country difference in 
employer–employee indirect communication on staffing plans, we do not expect 
to observe any within-country differences. The upper section of Table 
1 presents descriptive statistics on indirect communication on staffing plans for 
indigenous and foreign-owned companies in Norway and Denmark, respective-
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ly. Indirect communication comprises measures of management strategies to-
wards unions with regard to two staffing issues: the organization of work and 
subcontracting/outsourcing. The higher the score, the greater is the degree of 
employer–employee communication. The table indicates that companies in 
Norway, both indigenous (home) and foreign-owned, engage in a higher degree 
of indirect communication than companies in Denmark. This applies to both 
measures of indirect communication. The table indicates that we combine these 
two measures in an index that ranges from 1 to 5. This index is the basis of 
analysis in Table 2. 
 
The lower section of Table 1 shows to what extent management provides 
employees with direct information on staffing plans. The table indicates that 
57% of indigenous companies, and 61% of foreign-owned companies in Nor-
way provide such information regularly. In Denmark, the proportions are 37% 
and 55%, respectively. In other words, indigenous companies in Denmark stand 
out as engaging in the least degree of direct communication on staffing plans. 
In Tables 2 and 3, we test whether these differences hold when we control for 
other factors. 
 
Table 2 presents a linear regression analysis of indirect communication on 
staffing plans. The model controls for country combined with ownership, size 
and industry, HR policy and union recognition. Table 2 tests H1 and H2. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of indirect and direct communication of staffing.  
 Norway    Denmark    
 Home  Foreign  Home  Foreign  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Indirect communication 
Level of communication on: 
        
   Organization of work 3.0 1.1 2.9 1.0 2.5 1.3 2.3 1.2 
   Subcontracting and outsourcing 2.3 1.2 2.7 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.1 
Index (1-5) 2.6 1.0 2.8 1.0 2.0 0.9 2.0 1.0 
Direct communication         
Information on staffing plans   
   (yes = 1, no = 0) 
0.57 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.37 0.49 0.55 0.50 
N 26  39  24  63  
Note: Indirect communication: Which of the following best describes the policy 
towards working with unions: managements decides on its own (=1), manage-
ment consults union representatives (=3) or management decides jointly with 
union representatives ( =5) on ... work organization and sub-
contracting/outsourcing? The index is based on means of the two items. Direct 
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communication: Whether information on staffing plans is provided regularly to 
the LOG (largest occupational group) 
 
Table 2. Indirect employer–employee communication on staffing (ordinary least 
squares (OLS)). Reference category in parentheses. 
 Indirect  communication 
(index) 
 b SE 
DK foreign (ref: DK home) 0.223 0.258 
NO home 0.681* 0.284 
NO foreign 0.900** 0.268 
Manufacturing (ref: service) -0.060 0.167 
500-999 employees (ref: <500) 0.214 0.224 
>1000 employees 0.256 0.198 
Body/committee for HR policy (no committee) 0.028 0.176 
Union recognition (no/some sites) 0.166 0.246 
Constant 1.606** 0.353 
Adj R
2 
0.098  
N 133  
**p<0.01; *p<0.05 
Note: Dependent variable: Index of indirect communication on staffing on two 
items: organization of work and subcontracting/outsourcing. See note Table 1. 
 
Table 3. Direct employer–employee communication on staffing plans. Logistic 
regression. Reference category in parenthesis. 
 Direct  communication 
 b SE 
DK foreign (ref: DK home) 0.947
+
 0.501 
NO home 1.032
+
 0.568 
NO foreign 1.143* 0.532 
Manufacturing (ref: service) 0.562
+
 0.329 
500-999 employees (ref: <500) -0.575 0.425 
>1000 employees -0.500 0.409 
Body/committee for HR policy (no committee) -0.035 0.359 
Union recognition (no/some sites) -0.218 0.383 
Constant -0.541 0.597 
Adj R
2 
0.07  
N 171  
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; 
+
p<0.1 
Note: See note in Table 1 for measure of direct communication. 
 
Table 2 indicates that there are significant between-country differences in 
indirect communication on staffing plans. The positive coefficients of indige-
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nous companies in Norway (b = 0.681) and of foreign-based companies in Nor-
way (b = 0.900) imply that management in these establishments tend to engage 
in indirect communication with regard to staffing to a greater extent than estab-
lishments in Denmark. This supports H1 and may be explained by the more 
extensive and stringent legislative regulations on employment in Norway. Fur-
thermore, in line with H2, the table indicates that within each country there are 
no significant differences in indirect communication. Foreign and indigenous 
firms engage in indirect communication to the same extent in Norway and 
Denmark, respectively. We may further note that none of the control variables 
has any significant impact on indirect communication. 
Table 3 presents the results from a logistic regression analysis on direct 
communication, and tests H3, H4 and H5. The analyses include controls for 
country and ownership, size, industry, HR policy and union recognition. We 
expected firms in Norway to engage in a greater degree of direct communica-
tion. However, H3 is only partly supported in that it is only Danish indigenous 
firms that are significantly less inclined to engage in direct communication on 
staffing plans than are Norwegian firms. There is no significant difference be-
tween foreign firms in Denmark and firms in Norway. On the other hand, Table 
3 does provide unambiguous support for H4 in that there is no difference in the 
degree to which indigenous and foreign-owned firms in Norway engage in em-
ployer–employee direct communication. In other words, foreign and indigenous 
firms in Norway inform employees on staffing plans to the same extent. Fur-
thermore, Table 3 also provides support for H5 in that within Denmark indige-
nous firms engage in significantly less employer–employee direct communica-
tion than foreign-owned firms. This may be explained by these firms having a 
sense of the normative and cognitive leeway for achieving legitimacy that flex-
icurity and the incremental changes to it entails. In other words, the normative 
and cognitive implications of the flexicurity regulatory regime appear to be 
perceived differently by the foreign and indigenous firms in Denmark. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This article has explored direct and indirect employer–employee communica-
tion on staffing in two Nordic CME nations, Denmark and Norway. We argue 
that the evolving flexicurity model in Denmark entails an institutional setting 
that is sufficiently distinct from that of the regulated Norwegian model for there 
to be differences in both forms of employer–employee communication. In par-
ticular, it is argued that flexicurity provides Danish employers with a signifi-
cantly greater degree of latitude to engage in staffing changes than its Nordic 
counterpart Norway. Overall the flexibility component of flexicurity is a prod-
uct of less rigid regulations in the Danish setting and more ongoing negotia-
tions. It is associated with high job mobility and reduced labor power. We fur-
ther argue that the latitude Danish employers have to engage in numerical flexi-
bility which has implications for the degree to which they communicate with 
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employees in regard to staffing plans. Institutional theory leads us to suppose 
that firms located in the Danish setting will be less likely to engage in this 
communication. Our findings support this in regard to indirect communication 
and indicate partial support in regard to direct communication. 
Institutional theory is not limited to regulatory pressures, however. It also 
contains both normative and cognitive pressures. We have argued that incre-
mental changes to flexicurity in Denmark results in less normative and cogni-
tive clarity in regard to direct communication. We have argued that indigenous 
firms in Denmark have a superior insight into how the evolving changes to the 
‘rules of the game’ can be translated into new management practices. Thus we 
have proposed that indigenous firms in Denmark are more likely to engage in 
institutional entrepreneurialism than their foreign-owned counterparts. Indeed, 
we observe that Danish indigenous firms are significantly less inclined to en-
gage in direct communication than foreign-owned firms. Our reasoning under-
pinning hypothesis H3 underestimated the degree of conservatism among for-
eign-owned firms in Denmark. These firms engage in direct communication at 
the same level as firms located in Norway. 
On the whole, our thesis that flexicurity has consequences for employer–
employee communication is supported. In terms of indirect communication, in 
line with institutional theory, we observe that Norwegian firms are more likely 
to engage in indirect communication. In line with our actor perspective that 
emphasizes the common influence of labor unions across ownership categories, 
we observe no differences between indigenous and foreign-owned firms. 
In terms of direct communication, we have argued that the incremental 
changes to flexicurity afford Danish firms normative and cognitive latitude to 
engage in new management practices. We have further argued that indigenous 
firms will be more adept at sensing the normative and cognitive latitude that is 
provided by the system of flexicurity. Thus, we observe that Danish indigenous 
firms are significantly less inclined to engage in direct communication than 
foreign-owned firms. 
In general our findings challenge the notion of a single Nordic model. Nor-
wegian and Danish indigenous firms are significantly different in regard to both 
indirect and direct communication. More broadly, our findings suggest that the 
concept of the CME overlooks dissimilarities even between nations that have 
highly similar scores in terms of the Hall and Gingerich LME–CME index 
(2004). Our findings have some limitations. Although we regard employer–
employee communication on the issue of staffing plans as a critical indicator of 
the Nordic model, arguably future research should examine other aspects of 
collaborativeness, such as feedback from employees on their work environment. 
Our analysis should also be extended to the other Nordic countries and to other 
ostensibly similar CME countries. In doing so, our actor perspective suggests a 
careful consideration not only of regulation, but also of how the normative and 
cognitive aspects of regulation are interpreted and acted upon by salient parties. 
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Finally, in terms of indigenous firms, we have only included large enterprises 
that are particularly exposed to institutional pressures. Future research should be 
extended to include smaller firms. 
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Notes 
1. In Norway, the Main agreement consists of two parts. Part A ensures main 
principle rights, such as the right for employees to membership of a union. 
Part B consists of different cooperative forms between employers and em-
ployees (‘konsernutvalg’, ‘bedriftsutvalg’, etc.) (NOU, 2010). In addition to 
the main agreements a number of collective agreements are specified to oc-
cupational groups or workplaces (tariff agreements), which are typically re-
negotiated every four years. 
2. We have also checked for effects of the extent to which management are in 
favor, not in favor (very few) or neutral towards unions. In addition we 
have checked for the presence of European Work Councils. Neither of these 
variables had any significant effects.  
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Table A-1. Descriptive statistics of all independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
